↑ Shugart, Matthew Søberg (tháng 12 năm 2005). “Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns” (PDF). French Politics. Palgrave Macmillan Journals. 3 (3): pp. 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. Truy cập ngày 21 tháng 2 năm 2016. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as 'quite considerable' in Duverger’s sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people's elected agent. Such powers are especially relevant if an extraordinary majority is required to override a veto, as in Mongolia, Poland, and Senegal. |(các) trang= có văn bản dư (trợ giúp)
↑ Odonkhuu, Munkhsaikhan (ngày 12 tháng 2 năm 2016). “Mongolia: A Vain Constitutional Attempt to Consolidate Parliamentary Democracy”. ConstitutionNet. International IDEA. Truy cập ngày 21 tháng 2 năm 2016. Mongolia is sometimes described as a semi-presidential system because, while the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the SGKh, the president is popularly elected, and his/her powers are much broader than the conventional powers of heads of state in parliamentary systems.
.svg){kind=link}
